

Sika

Land	Schweiz
Versammlungstermin	Dienstag, 14. April 2015 14:00
Versammlungsort	Waldmannhalle, Neugasse 55, Baar
Art der Versammlung	Ordentliche Generalversammlung
Wertpapiere	ISIN CH0000587979, Telekurs 58797

Schwerpunkte der Generalversammlung

PUNKT 4.1 Wiederwahlen in den Verwaltungsrat (VR). Ethos ist der Auffassung, dass die 3 VR-Mitglieder, welche zum Zeitpunkt der Transaktion mit Saint-Gobain mit Schenker-Winkler Holding (SWH) assoziiert waren, nicht im Interesse des Unternehmens und seiner Minderheitsaktionäre gehandelt haben. Deshalb kann Ethos ihre Wiederwahl nicht unterstützen und empfiehlt GEGEN PUNKTE 4.1.2 Hr. Burkard, 4.1.4 Hr. Leimer und 4.1.8 Hr. Tinggren zu stimmen (Punkt 2.1.b der Ethos Richtlinien).

PUNKT 4.2 Antrag der SWH: Neuwahl von Herrn Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle. Eine Mehrheit des Verwaltungsrats empfiehlt, seine Wahl abzulehnen. Falls er gewählt wird, ist SWH im VR übervertreten, was nicht akzeptabel ist. Ethos empfiehlt DAGEGEN zu stimmen.

PUNKT 4.3 Wahl des VR-Präsidenten. Der VR schlägt vor, Dr. Hälg wiederzuwählen. Dr. Hälg ist mit der nötigen Sorgfalt gegenüber Sikas Minderheitsaktionären vorgegangen, und Ethos ist der Auffassung, dass er wiedergewählt werden muss. Ausserdem werden alle VR-Mitglieder, die nicht mit SWH assoziiert sind, zurücktreten, falls Dr. Hälg nicht wiedergewählt wird. Dadurch würde der VR massgeblich an Expertise verlieren und nur noch aus Vertretern von SWH bestehen. SWH schlägt die Wahl von Dr. Roesle vor. Die Mehrheit im VR empfiehlt SWHs Vorschlag abzulehnen. Ethos ist der Auffassung, dass Dr. Roesle nicht die nötige Industrie- und Management Erfahrung besitzt, um ein Unternehmen von der Grösse von Sika zu leiten. Ethos empfiehlt FÜR Dr. Hälg (PUNKT 4.3.1) zu stimmen und GEGEN Dr. Roesle (PUNKT 4.3.2) zu stimmen.

PUNKT 6.1 Antrag der Aktionärsgruppe um die Ethos Stiftung: Streichung der Opting out-Klausel. Dieser Antrag ist im Interesse des Unternehmens und seiner Minderheitsaktionäre. Ethos empfiehlt DAFÜR zu stimmen.

PUNKTE 6.2 und 6.3 Anträge der Gruppe Cascade, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Fidelity und Threadneedle: Sonderprüfung (PUNKT 6.2) und Sachverständigen-Ausschuss (PUNKT 6.3). Beides ist im Interesse des Unternehmens und der Minderheitsaktionäre. Die Sonderprüfung wird bei der Transaktion mit Saint-Gobain die Rolle der SWH-Vertreter im Sika VR untersuchen. Der Sachverständigen-Ausschuss wird die zukünftige Geschäftstätigkeit Sikas im Falle eines Transaktionsabschlusses überprüfen. Ethos empfiehlt DAFÜR zu stimmen.

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1. Generalversammlungs-Übersicht

1.1 Stimmempfehlungen an dieser Generalversammlung

Traktandum	Vorschlag	e	Abstimmungs- empfehlung Ethos	VR Empfehlung
1	Genehmigung des Jahresberichts, der Jahresrechnung und der Konzernrechnung		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
2	Verwendung des Bilanzgewinns und Festsetzung der Dividende		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
3	Entlastung der Mitglieder des Verwaltungsrates und der Geschäftsleitung		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4	Wahlen in den Verwaltungsrat			
4.1.1	Wiederwahl von Herrn Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.1.2	Wiederwahl von Herrn Urs F. Burkard	•	DAGEGEN	DAFÜR
4.1.3	Wiederwahl von Herrn Frits Van Dijk		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.1.4	Wiederwahl von Herrn Dr. oec. Willi K. Leimer	•	DAGEGEN	DAFÜR
4.1.5	Wiederwahl von Frau Monika Ribar		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.1.6	Wiederwahl von Herrn Daniel J. Sauter		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.1.7	Wiederwahl von Herrn Prof. Dr. sc. techn. Ulrich W. Suter		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.1.8	Wiederwahl von Herrn Jürgen Tinggren	•	DAGEGEN	DAFÜR
4.1.9	Wiederwahl von Herrn Christoph Tobler		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.2.1	Antrag der Schenker-Winkler Holding: Neuwahl von Herrn Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle		DAGEGEN	DAGEGEN
4.3	Wahl des Verwaltungsratspräsidenten			
4.3.1	Antrag des Verwaltungsrats: Wiederwahl von Herrn Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg als Präsident		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.3.2	Antrag der Schenker-Winkler Holding: Neuwahl von Herrn Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle als Verwaltungsratpräsident		DAGEGEN	DAGEGEN
4.4	Wahlen in den Nominierungs- und Vergütungsausschuss			
4.4.1	Wiederwahl von Herrn Frits Van Dijk als Mitglied des Nominierungs- und Vergütungsausschusses		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.4.2	Wiederwahl von Herrn Urs F. Burkard als Mitglied des Nominierungs- und Vergütungsausschusses	•	DAGEGEN	DAFÜR
4.4.3	Wiederwahl von Herrn Daniel J. Sauter als Mitglied des Nominierungs- und Vergütungsausschusses		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.5	Wahl der Revisionsstelle		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.6	Wahl des unabhängigen Stimmrechtsvertreters		DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5	Vergütungen			
5.1	Konsultativabstimmung über den Vergütungsbericht		DAFÜR	DAFÜR

Stimmempfehlungen



5.2	Verbindliche prospektive Abstimmung über die gesamte Vergütung des Verwaltungsrats	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.3	Verbindliche prospektive Abstimmung über die gesamte Vergütung der Geschäftsleitung	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
	Antrag der Aktionärsgruppe um die Ethos Stiftung		
6.1	Streichung der Opting Out Klausel	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
	Anträge der Aktionärsgruppe Cascade, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Fidelity und Threadneedle		
6.2	Sonderprüfung	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
6.3	Einsetzung eines Sachverständigen-Ausschusses	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
	Verschiedenes •	DAGEGEN	

1.2 Abstimmungsresultate der Generalversammlung vom Dienstag, 15. April 2014

Traktandum	Vorschlag	% JA	Resultat	Abstimmungs- empfehlung Ethos	VR Empfehlung
1.	Genehmigung des Jahresberichts, der Jahresrechnung und der Konzernrechnung	100 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
2.	Verwendung des Bilanzgewinns und Festsetzung der Dividende	100 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
3.	Entlastung der Mitglieder des Verwaltungsrates und der Geschäftsleitung	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
4.	Statutenänderung: Umsetzung der VegüV	88 %	Annahme	• DAGEGEN	DAFÜR
	Wahlen in den Verwaltungsrat		-		
5.1.1	Wiederwahl von Herrn Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg als Verwaltungsratpräsident	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.1.2	Wiederwahl von Herrn Urs F. Burkard	98 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.1.3	Wiederwahl von Herrn Frits Van Dijk	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.1.4	Wiederwahl von Herrn Dr. oec. Willi K. Leimer	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.1.5	Wiederwahl von Frau Monika Ribar	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.1.6	Wiederwahl von Herrn Daniel J. Sauter	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.1.7	Wiederwahl von Herrn Prof. Dr. sc. techn. Ulrich W. Suter	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.1.8	Wiederwahl von Herrn Christoph Tobler	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.2	Neuwahl von Herrn Jürgen Tinggren	96 %	Annahme	• DAGEGEN	DAFÜR
5.3	Wahlen in den Nominierungs- und Vergütungsauschuss		-		
5.3.1	Neuwahl von Herrn Frits Van Dijk in den Nominierungs- und Vergütungsauschuss	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.3.2	Neuwahl von Herrn Urs F. Burkard in den Nominierungs- und Vergütungsauschuss	95 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.3.3	Neuwahl von Herrn Daniel J. Sauter in den Nominierungs- und Vergütungsauschuss	96 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.4	Wahl der Revisionsstelle	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
5.5	Wahl des unabhängigen Stimmrechtsvertreters	100 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
6.1	Konsultativabstimmung über den Vergütungsbericht	98 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
6.2	Genehmigung der Gesamtsumme der künftigen Vergütung des Verwaltungsrates	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR
6.3	Genehmigung der Gesamtsumme der künftigen Vergütung der Konzernleitung	99 %	Annahme	DAFÜR	DAFÜR

Präsenzmeldung

Die Stimmbeteiligung an der Generalversammlung 2014 war 65% der stimmberechtigten Aktien (Unabhängiger Stimmrechtsvertreter: 19% und anwesende Aktionäre: 81%)

ethos





2. Proxy Analysis

Approve annual report, financial statements and accounts	FOR
The board of directors requests shareholder approval of the company's annual report and or consolidated accounts for the fiscal year 2014.	f the annual and
Company performance in 2014 (see detailed figures in section 3.3 of this report)	
- Total revenues variation in 2014	+8.3%
- Total revenues variation (3-year annualised)	+4.9%
- Operating margin 2014	11.4%
- Operating margin 2013	10.2%
- Net income variation	+28.0%
- Return on equity 2014	19.6%
- Return on equity 2013	17.0%
- Total Shareholder Return (TSR)	-5.9%
- 3-year TSR	76.2%

Change of control

On 5 December 2014, the board of directors and the Group management of Sika were informed that the Burkard family (Sika's founding family) intends to sell Schenker-Winkler Holding (SWH) to Saint-Gobain for CHF 2.75 billion, thereby indirectly transferring the control of Sika to Saint-Gobain. In fact, SWH owns all non-listed registered shares of Sika, which correspond to 15.3% of the capital and 52% of the voting rights (due to Sika's double class of shares, see point 3.2 of this report).

According to the Swiss Federal Law on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading, a shareholder who acquires more than one third of the voting rights of a listed company must make a public offer to acquire all listed shares at the same conditions as the last shares acquired. However, Swiss law allows companies to opt out of this obligation by including an ad hoc provision in their articles of association (opting out clause), which is the case at Sika. Saint-Gobain confirmed it has no intention to make an offer on Sika's listed shares.

The combination of the double class of shares and the opting out clause allows the Burkard family to sell its stake in Sika with an 80% premium on the share price (based on the share price prior to the announcement of the transaction). Ethos notes that between the day of the announcement of the transaction and the year-end 2014, the price of Sika's listed shares dropped by 24% (which explains the negative TSR shown above).

On 8 December 2014, Sika's board of directors and management announced that they do not support the change of control. In fact, the board and the management have neither been involved nor consulted in connection with the proposed transaction. Ethos supports the board of directors and management and considers that the hostile takeover of Sika by its competitor Saint-Gobain jeopardises the demonstrated success of the company. Shareholders holding more than half of Sika's capital have explicitly declared their support for the board and the management. In fact, the takeover by Saint-Gobain appears to be highly detrimental to the company and its minority shareholders, mainly for the following reasons:

- Sika will be under the control of a competitor. In fact, Saint-Gobain is the main competitor of Sika on the mortar market. Therefore, Saint-Gobain has a clear commercial interest to favour its own activities at the expense of Sika's.
- The corporate governance of the company will fundamentally change: Saint-Gobain announced that, upon completion of the transaction, a majority of the board members will be representatives of Saint-Gobain, while Sika's board has always consisted in majority of directors who were not linked to the controlling shareholder.

 Sika's financing costs will increase: Shortly after the announcement of the transaction, Standard & Poor's announced the downgrade of Sika's credit rating from A- to BBB.

On 10 December 2014, Sika received a request from SWH to convene an EGM in order to remove 3 directors from the board (Dr. sc. tech. Paul J. Hälg (chairman), Ms. Monika Ribar and Mr. Daniel Sauter) and to appoint Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle as board chairman and Dr. oec. Chris Tanner as board member. In the end of December, Dr. Tanner withdrew his candidacy on the grounds that his independence is not guaranteed.

Following the announcement of the EGM, 2 separate groups of shareholders requested to put additional items on the agenda:

- Ethos and 11 other shareholders filed a resolution to remove the opting out clause from Sika's articles of association (see ITEM 6.1).
- Cascade Investment L.L.C., Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Fidelity Worldwide Investment and Threadneedle Investments filed 2 resolutions to (1) conduct a special audit and (2) appoint a special expert committee (see ITEMS 6.2 and 6.3).
 Since the EGM was not held (see below), all shareholder resolutions (except the removal of 3 board members, which will be decided based on the voting results of their re-election) will be voted at this AGM.

On 26 January 2015, Sika's board of directors announced its decision to apply art. 4 of the company's articles of association (restriction of registration of registered shares to 5% of the total number of registered shares) to the shareholder group formed by SWH and Saint-Gobain and announced to the SIX Swiss Exchange on 11 December 2014. The shareholder group owns 2'330'858 registered shares and 42'701 bearer shares. Therefore, 116'694 registered shares are registered with voting rights (the voting rights of the bearer shares are not limited). The voting shares held by the shareholder group represent 3.6% of the total voting rights and 2.4% of the capital. Since 10% of the capital are necessary to convene an EGM, the board decided that SWH's request to convene an EGM was not valid. SWH submitted a request to the Cantonal Court of Zug to lift the registration restriction. On 23 March 2015, the Cantonal Court of Zug denied SWH's request and ruled that the registration restriction can be applied.

SWH also submitted a request to the Swiss Takeover Board (TOB) to determine (1) that the opting out clause applies in the case of the transaction between the Burkard family and Saint-Gobain and (2) whether and how the voting rights of SWH should be exercised on Ethos' resolution to remove the opting out clause. On 5 March 2015, the TOB validated the general principle of the opting out clause included in the articles of association. However, the TOB did not make a decision on whether the opting out applies to the specific case of the acquisition by Saint-Gobain. In addition, the TOB determined that SWH's voting rights can be exercised on Ethos' resolution to remove the opting out clause. On 6 March 2015, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Trust and Cascade Investment requested the TOB to declare that Saint-Gobain is obliged to submit a public tender offer for all the publicly-held shares in Sika. At the time of issue of this report, the TOB has not taken a position on this subject.

Ethos' recommendation

Ethos has no special concerns regarding the accuracy of the company's financial statements and accounts. As required by the Swiss Code of Obligations, the auditors confirmed that an internal control system designed for the preparation of financial statements exists as of 31 December 2014. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

Approve allocation of income and dividend		FOR
The board of directors proposes that the amount at the disposal of the	AGM be allocate	d as follows:
Available earnings brought forward	CHF	1'404'800'000
2014 Income	CHF	+258'700'000
At the disposal of the AGM	CHF	1'663'500'000
Payment of dividend	CHF	-182'600'000
Allocation to reserves	CHF	-
Carry forward to statutory accounts	CHF	1'480'900'000

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Key indicators

Consolidated net income	CHF	439.0 million
Free cash flow (Cash flow from operating activities - Capital expenditures)	CHF	432.7 million
Dividend per bearer share	CHF	72 (2013: 57)
Payout ratio		41.6%
Dividend yield (based on the share price at year-end)		2.5%
Net debt (Current and non-current debt - Cash and cash equivalents - Marketable securities)	CHF	224.0 million

Given the company's results, Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

Discharge board members and executive management FOR

The board of directors requests shareholders to discharge its members as well as those of the executive management of their responsibilities for their management of the company for the fiscal year 2014.

In line with the Swiss Code of Obligations, shareholders are requested to release the members of the board of directors from liability for their activities during the fiscal year under review. Shareholders that grant the discharge lose their right to file claims against the members of the board of directors for activities carried out during the year relating to facts that have been disclosed to shareholders. Nevertheless, all shareholders maintain their rights to file claims for facts that have not been disclosed to shareholders when the discharge was granted.

The meeting agenda stipulates that, upon approval of this item, the members of the board and the executive management will be discharged subject to the results of the investigations that will be conducted as part of the special audit requested under ITEM 6.2. Therefore, Ethos considers that the discharge can be approved and, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

However, Ethos notes that, at this stage, it is unclear whether the attitude and activities of Sika's board members who were linked to Schenker-Winkler Holding (SWH) at the time of the transaction (Mr. Urs F. Burkard, Dr. oec. Willi K. Leimer and Mr. Jürgen Tinggren) were in line with their duty of loyalty to Sika and thus whether they acted in the interests of the company and all its shareholders.

In fact, Ethos considers that the decision to sell the control of Sika to Sika's competitor Saint-Gobain (which, as mentioned above, was made without consulting Sika's management and independent board members) is highly detrimental to the company and its minority shareholders, as it jeopardises the demonstrated success of the company. Therefore, if an individual discharge is requested during the AGM, Ethos (who will be represent in person at the AGM) will, in accordance with point 1.2.d of its voting guidelines, OPPOSE the discharge of the following board members:

- Mr. Urs F. Burkard
- Dr. oec. Willi K. Leimer
- Mr. J
 ürgen Tinggren

Elections to the board of directors

The board of directors proposes that all its members be re-elected to serve for another 1-year term. In addition, Schenker-Winkler Holding (SWH) proposes that Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle be newly appointed as board member (ITEM 4.2.1) and chairman (ITEM 4.3.2). SWH's proposals are not supported by the board of directors.

SWH recommends to oppose the re-election of Ms. Monika Ribar, Dr. sc. tech. Paul J. Hälg (chairman) and Mr. Daniel J. Sauter. The board members who are not representatives of SWH (Ms. Ribar, Dr. Hälg, Mr. Sauter, Prof. Dr. Suter, Mr. Tobler and Mr. van Dijk) announced that they will accept re-election only if they are all re-elected and Dr. Hälg is confirmed as chairman (i.e. if Dr. Roesle is not elected as chairman).

Board size	9				
Combination of the functions of Chairman and CEO	No				
% independent directors	33.3%				
% representatives of SWH	33.3%				
% executive directors	0.0%				
% women directors	11.1%				
% directors with industry experience	44.4%				
Average age of directors	60.4				
Average board tenure	9.0 years				
Main features of the board after the AGM if SWH's recommendations prevail					
Board size	4				
Combination of the functions of Chairman and CEO	No				
% independent directors	0.0%				
% representatives of SWH	100.0%				
% executive directors	0.0%				
% women directors	0.0%				
% directors with industry experience	25.0%				
Average age of directors	59.5				
Average board tenure	7.8 years				

Ethos notes that if the recommendations of SWH prevail and thus Ms. Ribar, Dr. Hälg, Mr. Sauter, Prof. Dr. Suter, Mr. Tobler and Mr. van Dijk do not accept re-election, the composition of the board will not be in line with the company's articles of association, which stipulate that the board must consist of 5 or more members.

In addition, if the above 6 board members do not accept re-election, the board will loose significant expertise: 2 board members with extensive professional experience in the construction and materials industry (Dr. Hälg and Mr. Tobler) and one long-standing board member (Prof. Suter) who is an engineering professor specialised in the fields of chemicals and materials, where Sika is active, will leave the board, as well as the only 2 audit experts (Ms. Ribar and Mr. Sauter). Ethos considers that their presence on the board is extremely valuable and therefore supports their re-election.

As mentioned above, Ethos is in profound disagreement with the decision to sell the control of Sika to Saint-Gobain and considers that Sika's board members who were linked to SWH at the time of the transaction (Mr. Urs F. Burkard, Dr. oec. Willi K. Leimer and Mr. Jürgen Tinggren) did not act in the interests of the company and its minority shareholders. Therefore, Ethos cannot support their re-election.

4.1.1 Re-elect Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg

The board proposes to re-elect Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg (Swiss, 61) for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 2009 and chairman since 2012. He is considered independent. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

4.1.2 Re-elect Mr. Urs F. Burkard

The board proposes to re-elect Mr. Urs F. Burkard (Swiss, 58) for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 1990 and is currently member of the nomination and remuneration committee. As member Sika's founding family and vice chairman of SWH, he is considered affiliated.

FOR

OPPOSE

As mentioned above, Ethos considers that the members of the board of directors of Sika who are linked to SWH have not acted in the best interests of Sika and its stakeholders in consideration of the transaction with Saint-Gobain. Therefore, Ethos, in accordance with point 2.1.b of its voting guidelines, recommends to OPPOSE.

4.1.3 Re-elect Mr. Frits van Dijk

The board proposes to re-elect Mr. Frits van Dijk (Dutch, 68) for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 2012 and is currently chairman of the nomination and remuneration committee. He is considered independent. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

4.1.4 Re-elect Dr. oec. Willi K. Leimer

The board proposes to re-elect Dr. oec. Willi K. Leimer (Swiss, 57) for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 2010 and is currently member of the audit committee. As chairman of SWH until 9 December 2014, he is considered affiliated.

As mentioned above, Ethos considers that the members of the board of directors of Sika who were linked to SWH at the time of the transaction with Saint-Gobain have not acted in the best interests of Sika and its stakeholders. Therefore, Ethos, in accordance with point 2.1.b of its voting guidelines, recommends to OPPOSE.

4.1.5 Re-elect Ms. Monika Ribar

The board proposes to re-elect Ms. Monika Ribar (Swiss, 56) for a further 1-year term. She has been board member since 2011 and is currently chairman of the audit committee. She is considered independent. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

4.1.6 Re-elect Mr. Daniel J. Sauter

The board proposes to re-elect Mr. Daniel J. Sauter (Swiss, 58) for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 2000 and is currently member of the nomination and remuneration committee. Due to his long tenure on the board, he is considered affiliated. However, he has no conflict of interests. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

4.1.7 Re-elect Prof. Dr. sc. techn. Ulrich W. Suter

The board proposes to re-elect Prof. Dr. sc. techn. Ulrich W. Suter (Swiss, 71) for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 2003. Due to his long tenure on the board, he is considered affiliated. However, he has no conflict of interests. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

4.1.8 Re-elect Mr. Jürgen Tinggren

The board proposes to re-elect Mr. Jürgen Tinggren (Swedish, 57) for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 2014. As board member of SWH until 9 December 2014, he is considered affiliated.

As mentioned above, Ethos considers that the members of the board of directors of Sika who were linked to SWH at the time of the transaction with Saint-Gobain have not acted in the best interests of Sika and its stakeholders. Therefore, Ethos, in accordance with point 2.1.b of its voting guidelines, recommends to OPPOSE.

4.1.9 Re-elect Mr. Christoph Tobler

The board proposes to re-elect Mr. Christoph Tobler (Swiss, 58) for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 2005 and is currently member of the audit committee. Since he was a member of Sika's management (Head of the Industry division) from 1998 to 2004 before joining the board at the 2005 AGM, he is considered affiliated. However, he has no conflict of interests and Ethos supports his re-election. Ethos therefore recommends to vote FOR.



FOR

OPPOSE

FOR

FOR

FOR

OPPOSE

FOR

Schenker-Winkler Holding's proposal: Elect Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle 4.2.1

OPPOSE

SWH proposes to newly appoint Dr. jur. Max C. Roesle (Swiss, 66) as board member for a 1-year term. As representative of SWH, he is considered affiliated. Ethos notes that a majority of the board recommends to OPPOSE the election of Dr. Roesle as board member.

If Dr. Roesle is elected, SWH will be over-represented on the board, which is not acceptable. In addition, Ethos considers that it is not in the interest of good governance to elect a nominee whose election is not supported by a majority of the incumbent directors. Therefore, Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to OPPOSE.

4.3 Election of the chairman of the board

In accordance with the provisions of the Minder ordinance, the chairman of the board of directors must be elected by the shareholders. The board of directors proposes to re-elect Dr. Hälg as board chairman, while SWH proposes to newly appoint Dr. Roesle as board chairman. Since only one of the two candidates can be elected as board chairman, shareholders are requested to vote on each of the proposed nominees. The candidate who will receive the higher approval rate will be elected as chairman, provided that his election was approved by at least a majority of the votes cast.

As mentioned above, if Dr. Hälg is not re-elected as chairman, all the board members who are not linked to SWH will not accept re-election. Therefore, the board will loose significant expertise and be exclusively composed of directors who are linked to SWH. In addition, the board considers that Dr. Roesle does not have the industrial and management experience required to lead a global corporation with sales of over CHF 5.5 billion and 17,000 employees, which Ethos agrees. Therefore, Ethos considers that Dr. Hälg must be re-elected as chairman. Moreover, Dr. Hälg has fulfilled his chairmanship with the required diligence toward Sika's minority shareholder in the hostile takeover launched by Saint-Gobain.

4.3.1 Board's proposal: Re-elect Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg as chairman

The board proposes to re-elect Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg (Swiss, 61) as board chairman for a further 1-year term. He has been board member since 2009 and chairman since 2012. He is considered independent. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

4.3.2 Schenker-Winkler Holding's proposal: Elect Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle as chairman

SWH proposes to newly appoint Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle (Swiss, 66) as board chairman for a 1-year term. As representative of SWH, he is considered affiliated. Ethos notes that a majority of the board recommends to reject the election of Dr. Roesle as chairman. As mentioned above, Ethos cannot support the appointment of Dr. Roesle as chairman and, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to OPPOSE.

4.4 Elections to the nomination and remuneration committee

The board of directors proposes that Messrs. Burkard, Sauter and van Dijk be re-elected to the nomination and remuneration committee to serve for another 1-year term.

Main features of the nomination and remuneration committee composition after the AGM

Committee size	З
Number of independent members	1
Number of executive members	C
Number of members with executive functions within other listed	С

Since Ethos cannot support the re-election of Mr. Burkard to the board of directors (see ITEM 4.1.2), Ethos cannot approve his re-election to the nomination and remuneration committee. The other 2 nominees (Mr. Sauter and Mr. van Dijk) have no conflict of interests. Their re-election to the nomination and remuneration committee is therefore acceptable.

FOR

OPPOSE



4.4.1	Re-elect Mr. Frits van Dijk to the nomination and remuneration committee	FOR
	The board proposes to elect Mr. Frits van Dijk to the nomination and remuneration committee for a term. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.	a 1-year
4.4.2	Re-elect Mr. Urs F. Burkard to the nomination and remuneration committee	OPPOSE
	The board proposes to re-elect Mr. Urs F. Burkard to the nomination and remuneration committee year term. Since Ethos did not support his re-election to the board of directors under ITEM 4.1.2, E cannot approve his re-election to the nomination and remuneration committee and, in accordance point 2.4.a of its voting guidelines, recommends to OPPOSE.	Ethos
4.4.3	Re-elect Mr. Daniel J. Sauter to the nomination and remuneration committee	FOR
	The board proposes to re-elect Mr. Daniel J. Sauter to the nomination and remuneration committe year term. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.	e for a 1-
4.5	Election of the auditors	FOR
	The board of directors recommends that shareholders ratify the re-appointment of Ernst & Young a company's external auditors for a further 1-year term. Audit versus non-audit fees	as the
	Non-audit fees / Audit fees (2014)	45.7%
	Non-audit fees / Audit fees (3-year aggregate)	37.6%
	The breakdown of fees paid to the external auditor is adequately disclosed (see section 3.4 of this In light of the ratio of non-audit fees paid by the company to its external auditor, the re-appointmer auditor can be accepted. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOF	nt of the
4.6	Election of the independent proxy	FOR

The Minder ordinance requires that the independent proxy be elected by the shareholders. The board of directors therefore proposes the appointment of Dr. Max Brändli (lawyer in Zug) as independent proxy for a 1-year term.

Ethos is not aware of any potential conflict of interests and, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

5 Remuneration

In accordance with the Minder ordinance, the amounts of remuneration of the board of directors and the executive management are submitted to shareholder approval (binding separate votes). In addition, the board requests an advisory vote on the remuneration report. Therefore, the board requests 3 separate votes as follows:

- Advisory vote on the remuneration report 2014 (ITEM 5.1)
- Prospective vote on the total remuneration of the board of directors for the period from the 2015 AGM to the 2016 AGM (ITEM 5.2)
- Prospective vote on the total remuneration of the executive management for the financial year 2016 in a single vote (ITEM 5.3)



5.1 Advisory vote on the remuneration report

FOR

The board of directors requests an advisory vote on the remuneration report included in the annual report. While the vote is not binding, it allows shareholders to send a message to the board that could help shape executive remuneration. The remuneration report describes the remuneration policy and discloses the remuneration paid to both non-executive board members and members of the executive board. Section 4 of this report includes the description and detailed figures of the 2014 remuneration of the board of directors and of the members of the executive management of the company.

A) Changes implemented

In 2014, the following changes were introduced to the remuneration structure and report:

- The company further improved the transparency with regard to the performance achieved during the year under review. The pay-for-performance connection for the annual bonus is therefore clearer.
- The company discloses for the first time the ROCE taken into account to determine the vesting of the long-tem incentive (ROCE excluding acquisitions).
- The vesting condition under the long-term incentive was amended: For the grants made until 2013, the performance condition (ROCE excluding acquisitions) was measured in the last year of the 3-year vesting period. For the grants made from 2014, the performance condition will be measured as the average ROCE of the 1st year, the 2nd year and the 3rd year of the vesting period. Acquisitions will be excluded from the calculation of the ROCE in the year of acquisition and for 2 additional calendar years.
- The remuneration structure of the members of the board was amended: Up to 2013, the board members received a fixed fee paid in cash and a fixed number of shares. From 2014, they receive a fixed fee paid in cash and a fixed amount converted into shares based on the share price prior to the beginning of their annual term of office (AGM). The shares remain blocked for 4 years.

B) Ethos' appraisal of the remuneration system

B.1) Disclosure

• Sika's remuneration report is one of the most comprehensive and transparent among Swiss listed companies, which Ethos commends. All the elements necessary to assess the remuneration system and make informed decisions are clearly disclosed.

B.2) Remuneration structure: Board members

During the year under review, the chairman of the board, Dr. Hälg, received CHF 867'415 (-9.3%), while the other members of the board received on average CHF 247'563 (-1.2%). The chairman's remuneration is 3.5 times the average remuneration of the other members of the board.

Positive features

- The non-executive directors do not receive any performance-related remuneration or options, which is compliant with best practice.
- Part of their remuneration is paid in shares blocked for 4 years, which helps to align the interests of the board members with those of the shareholders. Ethos welcomes the change from a fixed number of shares to a fixed amount converted into shares, which avoids volatility in total remuneration at grant due to share price variations.
- Ethos considers that the amounts paid are acceptable in view of the size and complexity of the company (see ITEM 5.2).

B.3) Remuneration structure: Executive management

Members of the executive management, including the CEO, have a base salary and can receive variable remuneration under 2 incentive plans, which are described in detail under section 4.5 of this report. For the year under review, the company CEO, Mr. Jenisch, received a total remuneration of CHF 3'396'000 (+0.7%), of which 65% is variable. His total variable remuneration at grant represents 2.73 times his base salary. The other members of the management received on average CHF 1'678'625 (+4.8%), of which 51% is variable. Their total variable remuneration at grant represents 1.73 times their average base salary.



Positive features

- The overall level of remuneration of the CEO as well as the other members of the executive management is acceptable: It is below the median for companies comparable to Sika (Ethos' peer group consists of 21 companies (excluding companies active in financial services) listed in Switzerland, including Sika, that are comparable to Sika in terms of market capitalisation, number of employees, and total revenues).
- Both the annual bonus and the long-term incentive are clearly capped at reasonable levels. In fact, the CEO's bonus is capped at 162% of his base salary (including matching shares), while his long-term incentive is capped at 120% of his base salary. For the other members of the management, the bonus is capped at between 87% and 139% of the base salary (depending on the function), while the long-term incentive is capped at between 49% and 86% of the base salary.
- 20% of the annual bonus is mandatorily converted into shares blocked for 4 years. The members of
 the management can voluntarily defer a further 20%. Such a structure aims to align the interests of the
 management with those of the shareholders, acts as a retention and avoids large cash payouts for
 short-term results. In order to compensate the members of the executive management for the
 blocking period of the part of the bonus paid in shares, matching shares are allocated. However, 1
 matching share is granted for every 5 bonus shares blocked, which is not excessive.
- The major part of the variable remuneration is deferred and paid in shares. In addition, an important part of the variable remuneration is conditional upon the achievement of forward-looking long-term performance conditions.
- The variable remuneration effectively paid is in line with the performance of the company. In fact, 2014 was a record year for Sika in terms of sales growth as well as profitability. Since all targets were overachieved, the bonus payout is above the target set at the beginning of the financial year, and the long-term incentive vested in full.

C) Ethos' recommendation

Ethos considers that the company's overall transparency with regard to remuneration is very good, and that the level of remuneration is reasonable with regard to the size of the company. In view of the abovementioned positive features of the remuneration system, Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

5.2 Binding prospective vote on the total remuneration of the board of directors

The board of directors requests shareholder approval of the total maximum remuneration to be paid to the board of directors for the period from the 2015 AGM to the 2016 AGM (prospective vote).

A) Board proposal

The board requests a maximum total amount of CHF 3 million for the members of the board (including the chairman). In the meeting agenda, the amount is broken down as follows:

Fixed fee in cash	CHF	2'030'000
Fixed fee paid in the form of shares (blocked for 4 years)	CHF	750'000
Social security contributions	CHF	220'000
Total	CHF	3,000,000

B) Comparison to company peers

In 2013 (most recent figures available), the total remuneration paid to the members of the board of directors of companies similar to Sika (peers) was the following:

Median remuneration of chairmen	CHF	750'750
Median remuneration of other board members	CHF	250'471

NB: Ethos' peer group consists of 21 companies (excluding companies active in financial services) listed in Switzerland, including Sika, that are comparable to Sika in terms of market capitalisation, number of employees, and total revenues.

In 2014, CHF 2'775'718 were paid to the 8.7 (full-time equivalent) members of the board. If the board size remain at 9 members, the requested amount allows for a 5% increase in the total fees to be paid to the board.

FOR



Taking into account the fee structure in 2014 (see point 4.2.B of this report) and the 5% potential increase in remuneration, the requested amount can be split as follows:

Chairman	CHF	910'000
Other board members (average)	CHF	260'000

Therefore, the potential remuneration of the chairman is 21% higher than the median of the peer group (4% higher than the peer group for the other board members).

C) Ethos' recommendation

As mentioned above, the members of the board of directors cannot receive options or variable remuneration, which is in line with best practice. In addition, in view of the company's size and complexity, Ethos considers that the proposed board remuneration is acceptable. Therefore, Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

5.3 Binding prospective vote on the total remuneration of the executive management F

FOR

The board of directors requests shareholder approval of the total maximum remuneration to be paid to the executive management for the 2016 financial year (prospective vote).

The board requests a maximum amount of CHF 18 million to be paid to the 9 members of the executive management (including the CEO). In the meeting agenda, the amount is broken down as follows:

Fixed remuneration*	CHF	8'300'000
Short-term incentive**	CHF	6'100'000
Long-term incentive***	CHF	3'600'000
Total	CHF	18'000'000

* The amount requested for the fixed remuneration includes base salaries, expenses as well as social security and pension contributions (calculated based on the maximum potential variable remuneration)

** The amount requested for the short-term incentive corresponds to the maximum that can be paid out in early 2017 in case of overachievement of targets in relation to the performance of the 2016 financial year.

*** The amount requested for the long-term incentive corresponds to the maximum that can vest in 2019 in relation to the grants made in 2016.

Ethos notes that the amount requested for 2016 is the same as the amount that was requested at the 2014 AGM for the 2015 financial year, for the same number of beneficiaries. Ethos approved the requested amount at the 2014 AGM.

While Ethos would have preferred to vote retrospectively on the annual bonus to be able to assess the payfor-performance connection, Ethos considers that the requested amount is adequate. In fact, Sika's remuneration structure is in line with Ethos' guidelines, in particular the base salaries are reasonable and the proportion between variable and fixed remuneration respects the limits set in Ethos' guidelines. In addition, the effective remuneration paid, as described in the remuneration report, is in line with the company's performance (see ITEM 5.1). Therefore, Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

Proposal by the shareholder group led by the Ethos Foundation

Ethos and 11 other shareholders (Aargauische Pensionskasse, Bernische Pensionskasse (BPK), CIEPP – Caisse Inter-Entreprises de prévoyance professionnelle, comPlan, Luzerner Pensionskasse (LUPK), Anlagestiftung der Migros-Pensionskasse, Pensionskasse Basel-Stadt, Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich, Pictet Funds SA (Ethos), Vontobel Fonds Services AG (für Raiffeisen Futura Swiss Stock) und Vontobel Fonds Services AG (für Vontobel Fund (CH) – Ethos Equities Swiss Mid & Small A)) propose that the opting out clause be removed from Sika's articles of association. As of 23 March 2015, the group created by Ethos to support this resolution consisted of 58 institutional shareholders (including the co-filers of the resolution) and 170 private shareholders who jointly own 6.92% of the capital and 3.92% of the voting rights.

6.1 Deletion of the opting out clause

FOR



As mentioned under ITEM 1, opting out clauses exempt shareholders who acquire more than one third of the voting rights from the obligation to make a public offer to the rest of the capital. Such clauses can put a company at risk and be very detrimental to the stakeholders, in particular to minority shareholders, as is currently the case at Sika.

In the particular case of Sika, the opting out clause was introduced in the articles of association in 1998 to provide the Burkard family with more flexibility to manage their stake in the company without risking to cross a threshold requiring them to make an offer on all listed shares. This provision was not introduced to allow the Burkard family to sell their stake with a significant control premium. If fact, the Burkard family emphasised that if they sold their stake, the principle of fairness would apply, and they repeatedly and explicitly mentioned the importance of maintaining the independence of Sika. Therefore, the Burkard family has created a relationship of trust upon which the public shareholders could rely and which was breached by the transaction with Saint-Gobain.

As it turned out, the opting out clause currently included in Sika's articles of association strongly penalises minority shareholders in the case of a sale of the shares by a controlling shareholder. After the removal of the opting out clause, the buyer of the shares held by Schenker-Winkler Holding will have to make an offer to the rest of the capital. In addition, the offer must be made at equal conditions to all shareholders as the payment of a control premium is prohibited by Swiss law. Under such constraint, it is probable that Saint-Gobain will refrain from the purchase.

The resolution is in the interest of the company and its minority shareholders. Ethos notes that the board of directors recommends that this proposal be approved. Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

Proposals by the shareholder group formed by Cascade, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Fidelity, and Threadneedle

A group of shareholders consisting of Cascade Investment (USA), Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust (USA), Fidelity Worldwide Investment (USA) and Threadneedle Investments (UK) proposes that:

- A special audit be conducted (ITEM 6.2) pursuant to art. 697a al. 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations.
- A special expert committee be appointed (ITEM 6.3) pursuant to art. 731a al. 3 of the Swiss Code of Obligations.

As of 11 March 2015, the above shareholder group held 8.3% of the capital and 4.7% of the voting rights. Ethos notes that the board of directors recommends that both proposals be approved.

According to art. 693 al. 3 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, the affirmative vote of a majority of the capital represented (excluding voting rights privileges) is sufficient to approve both these proposals.

6.2 Special audit

FOR

Cascade, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Fidelity, and Threadneedle propose that a special audit be conducted regarding the events leading up to the announcement of the planned transaction by Schenker-Winkler Holding (SWH) and Saint-Gobain. In particular, the special audit would investigate the question of whether, within the 24 months prior to the 2015 AGM, non-public information regarding Sika was made available to Saint-Gobain or SWH. In addition, the special audit would clarify whether any arrangements have been made between board members (in particular the representatives of SWH) and Saint-Gobain or SWH.

Board members have a duty of loyalty to the company and all its shareholders. Therefore, they must act in the interests of both the company and its shareholders. As mentioned under ITEM 3, it is unclear at this stage whether the attitude and activities of Sika's board members who were linked to Schenker-Winkler Holding (SWH) at the time of the transaction (Mr. Urs F. Burkard, Dr. oec. Willi K. Leimer and Mr. Jürgen Tinggren) were in line with their duty of loyalty to Sika. The special audit would clarify this question.

In view of the controversies surrounding the transaction, Ethos considers that the goals of the proposed special audit are in the interests of the company and its stakeholders. Therefore, Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.



6.3 Appointment of a special expert committee

FOR

Cascade, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Fidelity, and Threadneedle propose the appointment of a special expert committee until at least the 2017 AGM to review and investigate the future conduct of business of Sika relating to SWH, the Burkard family and Saint-Gobain, in particular with regard to its effect on the public shareholders. Under the proposal, the special expert committee would in particular be instructed and authorised to:

- Review and investigate the business conduct of Sika that is related to SWH and/or Saint-Gobain or any of their representatives or advisors.
- Access all records and information of Sika (e.g. board minutes, board materials, confidential reports, plans and projects, correspondence, e-mail communication, drafts of such documents, etc.).
- Request any information from any member of the board of directors and Group management, employee or advisor of Sika.
- Inform the shareholders about its activities and findings at each general meeting and report at least twice a year.
- Enforce its rights to fulfil its mandate and to take all actions required to safeguard proper fulfilment of its mandate.

The shareholder group proposes that Peter Montagnon, Peter Spinnler and Jörg Walther be appointed to the special expert committee.

- Peter Montagnon (British, 65) is Associate Director of the Institute of Business Ethics (UK) since September 2013. Prior to that, he was Senior Investment Adviser at the Financial Reporting Council (the UK's independent regulator responsible for promoting high quality corporate governance and reporting). He served on the European Commission's Corporate Governance Forum from 2005 to 2011. He is the former chairman of the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN). He is also a visiting Professor in Corporate Governance at the Cass Business School of the City University, London, a member of the Corporate Governance Advisory Board of the Norges Bank Investment Management and of Board of the Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance in Dubai.
- Peter Spinnler (Swiss, 69) is board member of numerous boards and committees of governance organisations.
- Jörg Walther (Swiss, 54) is a partner at the law firm Schärer Rechtsanwälte in Aarau. He is board member at SFS Group (a Swiss listed company) and several non-listed companies.

Ethos considers that the appointment of a special expert committee to review the future conduct of the business of Sika with regard to the transaction between the Burkard family and Saint-Gobain is in the interest of the company and its stakeholders. In addition, Ethos considers that the proposed members of the committee are suitable for the role, since they have relevant experience and an appropriate balance of competencies. Therefore, Ethos, in accordance with its voting guidelines, recommends to vote FOR.

Transact any other business

OPPOSE

Ethos recommends to oppose any unannounced additional proposals made during the AGM either by the board or by a shareholder. The formal meeting agenda does not include this proposal which is only included in the proxy card with no precise item number. Ethos, in accordance with point 9.1 of its voting guidelines, recommends to OPPOSE.



3. Company Information

Before the General Meeting of 14 April 2015

3.1 General Information

Headquarters	Baar (ZG), Switzerland
Activities	Sika is active in the field of specialty chemicals with operations divided into two business areas: the Construction Division (81% of Group sales in 2014) and the Industry Division (19%). Sika is active in processing materials used in sealing, bonding, damping, reinforcing, and protecting of load-bearing structures.
Employees	Total number on 31.12.2014: 16895
Chairman	Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg (since 2012), Swiss, aged 61
CEO	Jan Jenisch (since 2012), German, aged 49
Listing	SIX Swiss Exchange



3.2 Capital

Structure	In CHF	Number	Nominal Value	Capital
	Registered shares	2'333'874	0.10	233'387
	Bearer shares	2'151'199	0.60	1'290'719
	Total Capital			1'524'107
	Only bearer shares are listed.			
	emptive rights via a conditional	capital of 259'822 bear	isation to increase its share capital v er shares (12.08% of bearer share c ts. There were no options or conver	capital)
	make a public offer to acquire a	II listed shares as stipul pholder exceeds the 33.	ption (opting-out clause) to the oblig ated in the Federal Law on Stock Ex .3% ownership threshold. Ethos and It clause (see ITEM 6.1).	xchanges and
Conditions to file a shareholder resolution	Date 31.12.2014	In CHF	Nominal value required Market value required	10'000 48'934'312
			% of voting share capital	0.66 %
	The threshold to add an item to	the agenda correspond	ds to 0.77% of the listed capital.	
Restriction on re- gistration of shares or voting rights			buyers of registered shares exceed an exception to this rule for the Bu	
or voting rights	Nominees are registered without	ut voting rights.		
Important shareholders	On 23 March 2015:			
	Holding: 17.0% of the capital ar the voting rights (decision of Sik - Shareholder group of Cascade Foundation (USA): 8.3% of the of - Support group for the resolution 3.92% of the voting rights (Etho	nd 52.9% of the voting (a's board - 26.01.2015) (USA), Fidelity (USA), T capital and 4.7% of the on filed by Ethos and 11 os' website - 23.03.2019	Threadneedle (UK), Bill and Melinda voting rights (SIX - 11.03.2015) other shareholders: 6.92% of the o	to 3.6% of Gates
		694 registered shares ar	nares and 42'701 bearer shares. As re registered with voting rights. The	



3.3 Financials and Key Figures

Year end	31. December

Reporting standard IFRS

		2014	2013	2012
Total revenues	CHF	5'571.30 million	5'142.20 million	4'828.90 million
EBIT	CHF	633.20 million	523.50 million	433.00 million
Net income attributable to shareholders (without minority interests)	CHF	439.00 million	342.20 million	276.90 million
Shareholders' equity	CHF	2'367.10 million	2'120.10 million	1'894.90 million
Market capitalisation at year-end	CHF	6'315.92 million	6'822.00 million	4'539.03 million
Earnings per registered share (basic)	CHF	28.87	22.55	18.33
Earnings per bearer share (basic)	CHF	173.19	135.27	109.95
Dividend per registered share	CHF	12.00	9.50	8.50
Dividend per bearer share	CHF	72.00	57.00	51.00
Payout ratio (on group net income)		41.57 %	42.14 %	45.95 %
Market value per bearer share at year end	CHF	2'936.00	3'171.00	2'110.00

Comments Since only bearer shares are listed, the market capitalisation is calculated based only on their value.

3.4 External Auditor

Auditor	Ernst & Young, since 1995			
Fees	In CHF	2014	2013	2012
	Audit fees	3'500'000	3'500'000	3'900'000
	Non-audit fees	1'600'000	1'400'000	1'100'000
	Total	5'100'000	4'900'000	5'000'000
Comments	The lead auditor, Ms. Bernadette	Koch, has been in charge since 20	010.	

In 2014, non-audit fees were broken down as follows:

- Tax consultancy fees: CHF 1.0 million


- Audit-related consultancy fees: CHF 0.6 million




4. Remuneration Report

4.1 Evolution of the Aggregate Remuneration

A Members of the Executive Management



B Board Members (Outside Executive Management)



4.2 Global Remuneration Figures

A Members of the Executive Management

		2014 Number	2014 CHF	2013 Number	2013 CHF	Var.
Total numb	er of persons (FTE)	9.0		9.0		
Cash	Fixed		4'797'000		4'728'000	1.5%
	Variable		4'148'000		3'442'000	20.5%
Shares	Fixed	0	0	0	0	0.0%
	Variable	NA	4'970'000	NA	5'173'000	-3.9%
Options	Variable	0	0	0	0	0.0%
Other			2'910'000		2'843'000	2.4%
Total			16'825'000		16'186'000	3.9%
Highest pai	d executive		3'396'000		3'374'000	0.7%
Average oth	ner executives		1'678'625		1'601'500	4.8%

B Board Members (Outside Executive Management)

		2014 Number	2014 CHF	2013 Number	2013 CHF	Var.
Total numb	er of persons (FTE)	8.7		8.0		
Cash	Fixed		1'883'333		1'800'000	4.6%
	Variable		0		0	0.0%
Shares	Fixed	NA	705'594	NA	734'000	-3.9%
	Variable	0	0	0	0	0.0%
Options	Variable	0	0	0	0	0.0%
Other			186'789		175'700	6.3%
Total			2'775'716		2'709'700	2.4%
Highest pai	d non-executive		867'415		956'400	-9.3%
Average oth	ner non-executives		247'563		250'471	-1.2%



Comments

A. Members of the executive management:

The executive remuneration includes the following elements:

- Base salary
- Short-term incentive paid in cash and shares (see point 4.5.B of this report)
- Long-term incentive in the form of Perfomance Share Units (PSUs, see point 4.5.C of this report)
- Pension
- Social security contributions, benefits in kind and other expenses

The highest paid executive was Mr. Jan Jenisch (CEO) both in 2013 and 2014.

B. Non-executive board members:

Members of the board (excluding the chairman) receive the following elements:

- Basic fee for board membership: CHF 150'000*

- Fixed amount paid in shares blocked for 4 years: CHF 50'000

- Additional fee for committee chairmanship: CHF 50'000

- Additional fee for committee membership: CHF 30'000

* In addition, the vice chairman of the board receive additonal remuneration in the amount of CHF 5'000 per day if additional work is required (e.g. to step in in the absence of the board chairman).

The chairman of the board receives the following elements:

- Basic fee (individually determined based on skills and experience) paid in cash
- Fixed amount (individually determined based on skills and experience) paid in shares blocked for 4 years
- Representation allowance

In case of change of control or liquidation, the shares are unblocked immediately.

The highest paid non-executive board member was Dr. Paul Hälg (chairman) both in 2013 and 2014.



4.3 Individual Remuneration Figures

Individual figures for 2014 (CHF)

A Members of the Executive Management

Name, Function	Cash Fixed	Cash Variable	Shares Fixed	Shares Variable	Options Variable	Other	Total
J. Jenisch, CEO	808'000	960'000	0	1'248'000	0	380'000	3'396'000
Average other executives	498'625	398'500	0	465'250	0	316'250	1'678'625

B Board Members (Outside Executive Management)

Name, Function	Cash Fixed	Cash Variable	Shares Fixed	Shares Variable	Options Variable	Other	Total
P. Hälg, Ch	510'000	0	299'872	0	0	57'543	867'415
J. Tinggren, VCh	100'000	0	34'540	0	0	10'214	144'754
U. Burkard, Mbr	180'000	0	53'026	0	0	17'690	250'716
W. Leimer, Mbr	180'000	0	53'026	0	0	17'690	250'716
M. Ribar, Mbr	200'000	0	53'026	0	0	19'153	272'179
D. Sauter, Mbr	180'000	0	53'026	0	0	17'690	250'716
U. Suter, Mbr	153'333	0	53'026	0	0	12'998	219'357
C. Tobler, Mbr	180'000	0	53'026	0	0	17'690	250'716
F. van Dijk, Mbr	200'000	0	53'026	0	0	16'121	269'147



4.4 Best Practice Checklist

A Members of the Executive Management

Company	practice
---------	----------

Each member's remuneration disclosed separately	-
All pay components disclosed separately (salary, bonus, LTI, pension)	Ok
Peer group's companies disclosed	Ok
Accrual principle applied	Ok
Performance criteria for short-term incentive adequately disclosed	Ok
% of annual bonus depending on individual criteria disclosed	Ok
Ex-post explanation of the level of achievement of the performance objectives for the short-term incentive	Ok
Performance criteria for the vesting of long-term incentive adequately disclosed	Ok
Precise performance objectives for the vesting of the long-term incentive disclosed	Ok
Level of vesting of the long-term incentive (in $\%$ of the initial grant) disclosed	Ok
Value realised upon vesting of the long-term incentive disclosed	Ok
Shares granted valued at fair market value	Ok
Options granted valued at fair market value	Not relevant

B Board Members (Outside Executive Management)

Company practice	Non-executive directors' fees partly paid in shares	Ok
	Non-executive directors do not receive options	Ok
	Non-executive directors do not receive performance based remuneration	Ok
	Minimum share ownership requirements exist for non-executive board members	-

4.5 Remuneration Structure (Executives)

A Remuneration Breakdown

Breakdown	Base salary	Short-term incentives	Long-term incentives	Pensions / Other
Of highest paid executive	23.8%	36.7%	28.3%	11.2%
Of other executives	29.7%	31.3%	20.2%	18.8%

B Short-term Incentives

Short-term incentives in % of base salary	On target	Maximum	Actual
Of highest paid executive	100.0%	162.0%	154.4%
Of other executives	NA	NA	105.3%

Performance criteria mentioned:

Group performance measured against a peer group of 25 companies (disclosed by the company):

- EBIT improvement
- Net sales growth

Individual objectives:

- Profitability (EBIT) of the business under responsibility
- Net working capital of the business under responsibility
- People and projects management

Additional description of the short-term incentive:

Group performance accounts for 60% of the bonus (EBIT improvement: 40%, net sales growth: 20%), while the individual objectives account for 40% of the bonus (EBIT: 20%, net working capital (NWC): 10%, people/project management: 10%).

For each objective of the Group performance, the payout factors are the following:

- Below the lower quartile of the peer group: no payout
- At the median: 100% of target
- Upper quartile: 150% of target
- Best in the peer group: 200% of target

Any payout factor in between is interpolated linearly.

For each individual objective, the payout factor can be between 0% and 200% of the target. The overall bonus is however capped at 150% of the target bonus.

According to the Sika Share Purchase Plan (SSPP), the members of management must convert 20% of their bonus into shares and can voluntarily defer a further 20%. For every 5 shares purchased under the SSPP, Sika grants 1 matching share. All shares have a blocking period of 4 years. In case of change of control or termination of employment due to retirement, death or disability, the blocking period may be shortened.

The target bonus of the CEO is set at 100% of his base salary (for the other members of the executive management: between 45% and 86%. The maximum bonus shown above has been caluclated including matching shares in case of maximum deferral (40% of the bonus).



C Long-term Incentives

Incentive	Plan 1	Plan 2	Plan 3
Type of awards	PSUs		
Fair value at grant date disclosed	No		
Vesting period for time-vesting awards	Not relevant		
Performance period	3 years		
Sale restriction after performance/vesting period	4 years		
Absolute performance criteria for vesting	ROCE		
Relative performance criteria for vesting	None		
Initial grant for the highest paid (in % of the base salary)	120%		
Minimum final grant (in % of initial grant)	0%		
Maximum final grant (in % of initial grant)	100%		

Comments

Each year, a certain number of Performance Share Units (PSUs) is granted to each executive manager. The PSUs vest after a period of 3 years depending on the return on capital employed (ROCE). The average ROCE achieved during the performance period is assessed against the target ROCE set by the board at the beginning of the vesting period. For the 2014 grant, the ROCE target (excluding acquisitions) is 20% and the threshold is 18%.

The PSUs vest into shares as follows:

- ROCE below the threshold level: 0%

- ROCE at the threshold level: 50%

- ROCE at or above target: 100%

- ROCE between threshold and target level: linear interpolation

The shares are allocated at their fair market value in the month of April following the 3-year vesting period. From this allocation date, the shares have a further blocking period of 4 years, during which they are excluded from trading.

In case of change of control, the shares are unblocked immediately and the board of directors has the discretion to determine the appropriate measure regarding the PSUs.

In 2014, the target amounts to 120% of base salary for the CEO and ranges bewtween 49%-86% for other executives.

For the LTI that vested in 2014, the ROCE performance condition of 20% in the last year of the vesting period (old plan rule) has been overachieved: in 2014, ROCE (excluding acquisitions) amounts to 27.3%, leading to a full vesting.



4.6 Remuneration and Financial Performance

A Change in Remuneration 2013-2014

Highest paid executive	0.7%
Average other executives	4.8%
Highest paid non-executive	-9.3%
Average other non-executives	-1.2%

B Change in Financial Performance 2013-2014

Sales	8.3%
Operating income	21.0%
Net income	28.3%
Total shareholder return	-5.6%



4.7 Share and Option Holdings

A Members of the Executive Management

Name	Function	31.12.2014 Shares	31.12.2014 Options	31.12.2013 Shares	31.12.2013 Options
J. Jenisch	CEO	1'400	0	1'350	0
Total other executives		4'905	0	8'088	0
Total		6'305	0	9'438	0

B Board Members (Outside Executive Management)

Name	Function	31.12.2014 Shares	31.12.2014 Options	31.12.2013 Shares	31.12.2013 Options
P. Hälg	Ch	490	0	350	0
J. Tinggren	VCh	84	0	NA	NA
U. Burkard	Mbr	770	0	190	0
W. Leimer	Mbr	52	0	26	0
M. Ribar	Mbr	74	0	48	0
D. Sauter	Mbr	2'052	0	2'026	0
U. Suter	Mbr	52	0	26	0
C. Tobler	Mbr	252	0	326	0
F. van Dijk	Mbr	102	0	51	0
Total		3'928	0	3'043	0

Comments

The shareholdings of Mr. Burkard do not include the shares held by Schenker-Winkler Holding.



5. Board of Directors

Composition after the General Meeting of 14 April 2015

Committee	Executive	Affiliated non-executive	Independent non-executive	Total
Board of Directors	0	7	3	10
Audit committee	0	2	1	3
Nomination and remuneration committee	0	2	1	3

Election procedure for directors	Individual
Mandate duration	1 year
Mandatory age limit	70
Single signature	No
Number of board meetings during the past year	8
Number of audit committee meetings during the past year	5
Number of nomination and remuneration committee meetings during the past year	6 (94% attendance)
Attendance rate at board meetings not disclosed	

Upon reaching the age of 70, directors have to resign. Prof. Ulrich Suter reached the age of 70 in 2014.

The board includes 1 woman.



Dr. sc. techn. Paul J. Hälg

Dr. sc. lechn. Faul J. F	laiy	
Independent	Chairman	Up for Re-election
Nationality	Swiss	
Age	61	
Director since / term ends	2009 / 2016	
Committee memberships	none	
Main activity	 Dätwyler, CEO 	
Directorships	– Alvest AG, Chairman	
Other relevant mandates	 Wohlfahrtsfonds der Dätwyler Holding AG, Chairman Wohlfahrtsstiftung der Sika, Chairman 	
Comments	Executive Vice President of Forbo International SA (2001-2004). Various positions at Gurit-Essex (1987-2001), ultimately as CEO.	

Dr. iur. Max C. Roesle

Affiliated	Chairman	New Nominee
Nationality Age Director since / term ends Committee memberships Affiliation	Swiss 66 2015 / 2016 none - Important shareholder or its representative Chairman of Schenker-Winkler Holding.	
Main activity	 Roesle Frick & Partner law firm, Partner and founder 	
Directorships	 Schenker-Winkler Holding, Chairman Banca des Cerisio SA, Chairman CRH Finance Switzerland AG, Chairman Genco Capital AG, Chairman ConCardis Schweiz AG, Vice Chairman Primapa AG, Vice Chairman Bank von Roll AG, Member GFG Gesellschaft für Grundeigentum AG, Member Specialma AG, Member Zuri-Invest AG, Member 	
Other relevant mandates	 W + I Kerscher Stiftung, Member CLB Stiftung, Member Fondation à la mémoire de Oskar Kokoschka, Member Stiftung sahee, Member 	



Urs F. Burkard

ererreandra		
Affiliated	Member	Up for Re-election
N - 1' 1' -		
Nationality	Swiss	
Age	58	
Director since / term ends	1990 / 2016	
Committee memberships	 Nomination and remuneration committee 	
Affiliation	 Important shareholder or its representative Board membership exceeding time limit for independence 	
	Member of the founding family. Vice chairman of Schenker-Winkler Hold	ding.
Main activity	– Büro Design Burkard GmbH, CEO	
Directorships	 Schenker-Winkler Holding, Co-owner and Vice Chairman Pynogin AG, Co-owner and Member Gazet Holding AG, Member 	

Dr. oec. Willi K. Leime	r	
Affiliated	Member	Up for Re-election
Nationality	Swiss	
Age	57	
Director since / term ends	2010 / 2016	
Committee memberships	– Audit committee	
Affiliation	- Miscellaneous	
	Chairman of Schenker-Winkler Holding until 9 December 2014.	
Main activity	 WMPartners Wealth Management AG, Partner 	
Directorships	 ISPartners Investment Solutions AG, Chairman and co-owner WMPartners Wealth Management AG, Member 	
Comments	Managing director of Private Wealth Management at Bank Morgan Stanley,	, Zurich (1990-2002).



Monika Ribar

Independent	Member	Up for Re-election
Nationality	Swiss	
Age	56	
Director since / term ends	2011 / 2016	
Committee memberships	– Audit committee, Chairman	
Main activity	– ribar partners GmbH (Consulting Firm, Switzerland), Managing partner	
Directorships	 Logitech, Member Lufthansa (Germany), Member Rexel (France), Member Swiss Federal Railways (SBB-CFF-FFS) (Switzerland), Vice Chairman Chain IQ Group AG (Switzerland), Member Swiss International Air Lines AG (Switzerland), Member 	
Comments	Several positions at Panalpina (1991-2013), including: - CEO (2006-2013). - CFO (2005-2006). - Chief Information Officer (2000-2005). - Corporate Controller (1991-2000).	

Daniel J. Sauter		
Affiliated	Member	Up for Re-election
Nationality	Swiss	
Age	58	
Director since / term ends	2000 / 2016	
Committee memberships	 Nomination and remuneration committee 	
Affiliation	- Board membership exceeding time limit for independence	
Main activity	none	
Directorships	 Julius Bär, Chairman Trinsic AG, Co-owner and Chairman Hadimec AG, Chairman 	
Comments	Chairman of the board of directors of Alpine Select AG (2001-2012). CEO and Delegate of the board of Xstrata AG (1994-2001). CFO and Senior Partner of Glencore International AG (1983-1998).	



Prof. Dr. sc. techn. Ulrich W. Suter

Affiliated	Member	Up for Re-election
Nationality	Swiss	
Age	71	
Director since / term ends	2003 / 2016	
Committee memberships	none	
Affiliation	 Board membership exceeding time limit for independence 	
Main activity	none	
Directorships	 Wicor Holding AG, Chairman ETH Zürich SEC AG, Chairman Rainbow Photonics AG, Member 	
Other relevant mandates	– Stiftung Bibliothek Werner Oechslin, Chairman – Swisscontact, Schweizerische Stiftung für technische Entwicklungszusa Member – Pensionskasser der Weidmann Unternehmen, Member	mmenarbeit,
Comments	Consultant to the Head National Reasearch Foundation (Singapore). Professor at ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology), Departme Science (1988-2008). Professor at MIT, Department of Chemical Engineering (1982-1989).	nt of Material



Jürgen Tinggren		
Affiliated	Member	Up for Re-election
Anniateu		Op for ne-election
Nationality	Swedish	
Age	57	
Director since / term ends	2014 / 2016	
Committee memberships	none	
Affiliation	- Miscellaneous	
	Board member of Schenker-Winkler Holding until 9 December 2014.	
Main activity	none	
Directorships	 Schindler, Member Tyco International (Ireland), Member 	
Other relevant mandates	– The Conference Board (USA), Board of Trustees, Member	
Comments	 Several managing positions at Schindler (1997-2013): CEO (2011-2013). President of the Group Executive Committee (2007-2011). Deputy President of the Group Executive Committee, responsible for Tech Strategic Procurement (2005-2007). Member of the Group Executive Committee, responsible for Asia/Pacific (Member of the Group Executive Committee, responsible for Europe (1997) Various positions at Sika (1985-1997), ultimately as member of the manage with responsibility for North America. 	1999-2005). 7-1999).

Christoph Tobler		
Affiliated	Member	Up for Re-election
Nette e l'i		
Nationality	Swiss	
Age	58	
Director since / term ends	2005 / 2016	
Committee memberships	- Audit committee	
Affiliation	- Miscellaneous	
	Linked to the company since 1998.	
Main activity	 Sefar Holding AG, CEO and board member 	
Directorships	– Aktiengesellschaft Cilander, Chairman	
Other relevant mandates	– economiesuisse, Member – Swiss National Bank (SNB), Regional Advisory Board, Member	
Comments	Head of Sika's Industry Division (1998-2004).	

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Frits van Dijk		
Independent	Member	Up for Re-election
Nationality	Dutch	
Age	68	
Director since / term ends	2012 / 2016	
Committee memberships	 Nomination and remuneration committee, Chairman 	
Main activity	none	
Directorships	 Nestlé Malaysia Berhad, Member 	
Comments	Career at Nestlé (1970-2011), ultimately member of the executive manager	ment (2000-2011).



6. Glossar

English	Deutsch	Français
A		
Activities	Aktivitäten	Activités
Affiliated	Affiliiert	Affilié
AGM (Annual General Meeting)	Ordentliche Generalversammlung	Assemblée générale ordinaire
Annual bonus	Jahresbonus	Bonus annuel
Attendance rate	Teilnahmequote	Taux de présence
Audit committee	Prüfungsausschuss	Comité d'audit
Audit fees	Honorare für Revisionsdienstleistungen	Honoraires de révision
Audit-related fees	Honorare für revisionsnahe Dienstleistungen	Honoraires pour les services liés à la révision
Autorised capital	Genehmigtes Kapital	Capital autorisé
Average	Mittelwert	Moyenne
В		
Base salary	Grundgehalt	Salaire de base
Bearer share	Inhaberaktie	Action au porteur
Board meeting	Verwaltungsratssitzung	Séance du conseil d'administration
Board members	Verwaltungsratsmitglieder	Membres du conseil d'administration
Board of directors	Verwaltungsrat	Conseil d'administration
Breakdown	Detaillierte Offenlegung	Répartition détaillée
С		
Capital	Kapital	Capital
Capital contribution reserves	Reserven aus Kapitaleinlagen	Réserves issues d'apports en capital
CEO (Chief Executive Officer)	Geschäftsleiter	Président de la direction générale
Chairman	Verwaltungsratspräsident	Président du conseil d'administration
Chairman's committee	Ausschuss des Verwaltungsratspräsidenten	Comité du président du conseil d'administration
Comments	Kommentare	Commentaires
Committee meeting	Ausschusssitzung	Séance du comité
Conditional capital	Bedingtes Kapital	Capital conditionnel
Corporate governance committee	Ausschuss für Corporate Governance	Comité de gouvernance d'entreprise
D		
Dividend	Dividende	Dividende
Dividend rights certificates	Partizipationsscheine	Bons de participation
E		
Earnings per share	Gewinn pro Aktie	Bénéfice par action

Glossar



English	Deutsch	Français
E		
EGM (Extraordinary General Meeting)	Ausserordentliche Generalversammlung	Assemblée générale extraordinaire
Election	Neuwahl	Election
Election procedure for directors	Wahlverfahren für Verwaltungsräte	Procédure d'élection des administrateurs
Employees	Personalbestand	Employés
Executive management	Geschäftsleitung	Direction générale
External auditor	Externe Revisionsstelle	Auditeur externe
F		
Fair value	Beizulegender Zeitwert	Juste valeur
Fees	Gebühren	Honoraires
Financial performance	Finanzergebnis	Performance financière
Financial reporting	Finanzberichterstattung	Information financière
Financials	Finanzergebnis	Données financières
G		
General information	Allgemeine Informationen	Informations générales
Global remuneration figures	Allgemeine Vergütungsangaben	Rémunérations agrégées
н		
Headquarters	Hauptsitz	Siège social
Highest paid executive	Höchstbezahltes Mitglied der Konzernleitung	Membre le mieux rémunéré de la direction générale
1		
Important shareholders	Bedeutende Aktionäre	Actionnaires importants
Independent	Unabhängig	Indépendant
Individual remuneration figures	Individuelle Vergütungsangaben	Rémunérations individuelles
Internal Control	Internes Kontrollsystem	Contrôle interne
К		
Key figures	Kennzahlen	Chiffres clés
L		
Listing	Kotierung	Cotation
LTIP (Long-term incentive plan)	Langfristige Beteiligungspläne	Plan de participation à long terme
M		
Mandate duration	Mandatsdauer	Durée du mandat
Mandatory age limit	Obligatorische Altersgrenze	Limite d'âge statutaire
Market capitalisation	Marktkapitalisierung	Capitalisation boursière
Market value	Marktwert	Valeur boursière
Ν		
NA (Not available)	Nicht verfügbar	Pas disponible
ND (Not disclosed)	Nicht offengelegt	Pas publié
Net income	Reingewinn	Bénéfice net

Glossar



English	Deutsch	Français
Ν		
Net revenues	Nettoerträge	Revenus nets
New nominee	Neuer Kanditat / Neue Kandidatin	Nouveau candidat
Nomination and remuneration committee	Nominations- und Vergütungsausschuss	Comité de nomination et de rémunération
Nomination committee	Nominationsausschuss	Comité de nomination
Non-audit fees	Honorare für nicht revisionsbezogene Dienstleistungen	Honoraires non liés à la révision
Non-voting equity securities	Genussscheine	Bons de jouissance
Notice period	Kündigungsfrist	Délai de préavis
NR (Not relevant)	Irrelevant	Pas pertinent
0		
Operating income	Betriebsergebnis	Résultat d'exploitation
Operating margin	Operative Marge	Marge opérationnelle
Р		
Payout ratio	Gewinnausschüttungsquote	Taux de distribution du bénéfice
Peer group	Vergleichsgruppe	Groupe de référence
Pensions	Altersvorsorge	Contributions de retraite
Performance criteria	Leistungskriterien	Critères de performance
R		
Re-election	Wiederwahl	Réélection
Registered share	Namensaktie	Action nominative
Remuneration	Vergütung	Rémunération
Remuneration committee	Vergütungsausschuss	Comité de rémunération
Reporting standard	Rechnungslegungsstandard	Norme comptable
Restriction on registration of shares or voting rights	Beschränkungen der Übertragbarkeit der Aktien und des Stimmrechts	Restrictions relatives à l'inscription des actions ou aux droits de vote
Return on equity	Eigenkapitalrendite	Rendement des capitaux propres
Risk committee	Risiko-Ausschuss	Comité des risques
S		
Share and option holdings	Aktien- und Optionenbesitz	Détention d'actions et d'options
Share capital	Aktienkapital	Capital-actions
Shareholder resolution	Aktionärsantrag	Résolution d'actionnaire
Shareholders' equity	Eigenkapital	Capitaux propres
Short-term incentives	Kurzfristige variable Vergütung	Rémunération à court-terme
Stock ownership requirements	Aktienbesitz Anforderungen	Exigences en matière de détention d'actions
Strategy committee	Strategie-Ausschuss	Comité de stratégie
Structure	Struktur	Structure
Sustainability committee	Ausschuss für Nachhaltigkeit	Comité de développement durable

Glossar



English	Deutsch	Français	
Т			
Total revenues	Betriebsertrag	Revenus totaux	
Total shareholder return	Gesamte Aktienrendite	Rentabilité de l'action	
U			
Up for re-election	Zur Wiederwahl	A réélection	
Υ			
Year end	Jahresende	Fin de l'année	



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Analyst:

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About Ethos

The Ethos Foundation aims at promoting socially responsible investment as well as a stable and prosperous socio-economic environment. Ethos is composed of more than one hundred Swiss pension funds and non-profit foundations. Its fully owned subsidiary Ethos Services is an acknowledged provider of consulting services comprising socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, shareholder meeting analyses and an investor engagement and dialogue programme. For further information: www.ethosfund.ch.

Frequently used abbreviations

AGM EGM NA	Annual General Meeting Extraordinary General Meeting Not available
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
COO	Chief Operating Officer
OE	Other Executive Function
Ex-	Former



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